Amitai Etzioni Notes

The Moral Minimum in Arming Rebels

Originally published in National Interest on 6/11/13

The debate about whether to arm the Syrian rebels is centered around the question which groups are “good” rebels (those who favor democratic regimes and the United States) or “bad” rebels (various kinds of jihadists). The Obama administration is widely reported to be reluctant to aid Syrian rebels due to the difficulty of identifying “leaders who are committed to a unified, democratic Syria that respects minority rights” as opposed to “militants who might turn them against Western interests.” In Dissent, Michael Walzer finds that his readers “would be happy to see the victory of Syrians who have been studying John Stuart Mill or who take their cue from Swedish social democracy,” which he warns is not going to happen.

By focusing on whether or not the rebels favor democracy, the United States risks falling into the same moral trap that ensnared it in Libya. There, Washington found itself supporting rebels who committed very similar atrocities to those committed by the forces it came to save them from, namely Qaddafi’s goons. A recently issued report from the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria accused Syrian rebels of “war crimes, including murder, extrajudicial killings and torture . . . perpetrated by anti-government armed groups.” The American media paid little attention to reports that nearly half of those killed in Syria are not rebels or civilians on their side—but Alawite. Both sides almost never take prisoners, but kill those who surrender. And the rebels put snipers on roofs of schools in session.

Read the rest here.

What John Kerry Can Learn From John F. Kennedy

Originally published in The Atlantic on 6/6/2013

"Some say that it is useless to speak of peace... until the leaders of the Soviet Union adopt a more enlightened attitude. I hope they do. I believe we can help them do it. But I also believe that we must reexamine our own attitudes, as individuals and as a Nation, for our attitude is as essential as theirs," said former President John F. Kennedy as he stood at American University on June 10, 1963. The rarely discussed reset of U.S.-Soviet relationship that followed Kennedy's speech has significant implications when it comes to both present-day U.S.-China relations and the restarted Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.

Kennedy's "Strategy for Peace" speech was delivered at the height of the Cold War, only eight months after the Cuban Missile Crisis had pushed the world to the brink of nuclear war. He called for a change in how the two superpowers related to one another and emphasized the need for the United States to reexamine its hostile orientation towards the Soviet Union. Going beyond just changing drastically the tone that had previously been adopted when discussing the U.S.S.R., Kennedy added a major unilateral move. He announced that the US would stop all nuclear tests in the atmosphere. Although there is no evidence that President Kennedy proceeded on the basis of a particular theory of international relations, in effect the announcement served as an experiment highly relevant to an issue debated among IR experts at the time. Most IR experts viewed negotiations as an essential tool of diplomacy. Unilateral concessions were considered a show of weakness and were often criticized that they amounted to appeasement. A few theorists (including Charles Osgood and myself) argued that limited unilateral moves would elicit similar responses and would serve to improve the context which, in turn, was necessary to allow for productive negotiations.

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The Realism of Richard Haass

Originally published in National Interest on 5/31/13

Richard Haass’s new book, Foreign Policy Begins at Home, should delight realists. His strong case that we should put our own house in order is neither isolationist nor declinist. On the contrary, he persuasively shows that United States continues to be the indispensable nation: as he puts it, if the United States will not provide leadership for the world order, no other nation stands ready to take over. Nor is there a contradiction between focusing on shoring up the nation at home and its international role. To maintain its status in the world, the United States must have a strong economy, polity and society.

Haass is not the first to argue that the time has come to focus on nation building at home, but he goes well beyond such general statements by providing a list of particulars, of that which must be done. The list includes reducing not just the deficit but also the debt. This requires cutting defense costs (which Haass holds has been largely achieved), reductions in domestic spending (which he does not mention but has been largely carried out), cutting entitlements and raising revenues. He favors a ratio of 3:1 for cutting spending and raising taxes.

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The Danger of Overcorrecting on Terror

Originally published in National Interest on 5/29/13

In a speech last week at the National Defense University, President Obama made clear that he is moving to the left. This will mean more transparency and Congressional oversight of his high flying drone program, new ways to close Gitmo, and cutting the list of terrorist groups that may be hit. Last week, he promoted a shield for journalists who publish state secrets—a shield against the kind of government inquiry that his attorney general just carried out in collecting the phone records of the Associated Press. And Obama has already vastly reduced the number of drone hits.

The president is on his way to overcorrect previous over-corrections—a mouthful that requires a brief sociological detour.

Read the rest at here.

Charge American Terrorists With Treason

Originally published in The Atlantic on 5/24/2013.

When Boston bombing conspirator Dzhokhar Tsarnaev was captured, the event brought up--again--questions about the proper legal procedures for perpetrators of terrorism, particularly when those terrorists who are American citizens. Several conservative senators rushed to suggest that Tsarnaev be designated an "enemy combatant," which would allow for the suspension of his habeas corpus rights and the relaxation of what are otherwise Constitutional rights to due process and, by extension, certain rules of evidence and so forth. Meanwhile, it has long been the position of many on the left that the strongest statement of American values should be to try terrorists as ordinary criminals, with all the Constitution rights to which ordinary criminals are entitled.

Though the particular debate over Tsarnaev appears to be over--he will be tried in civilian court--it's worth revisiting the conundrum his crime presented and those other American terrorists present. It is not so clear that the only choices are those that have been aired by pundits on television. In fact, there are strong moral reasons to treat terrorists who are Americans, leading with Mr. Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, neither as common criminals nor as enemy combatants, but rather as Americans who have committed treason.

Currently, American terrorists often command rights to due process under the Constitution other terrorists treated as enemy combatants are not entitled to. However, American terrorists also commit a serious, additional offense when they raise their arms against their nation, a crime that other terrorists are incapable of committing. To put it differently, when Americans attack the U.S., they commit two offenses: the act of terror (including the murder that accompanies it) and the undermining of the trust Americans invest in each other--trust which serves as a basis for a robust civil society. To understand the importance of this kind of trust, recall the poisonous social climate at the height of the McCarthy era, when people felt that there was "a communist under every bed"--even though there were only a very tiny number of Americans who actually betrayed their country. This is the kind of social malaise that would arise if a large number of Americans did indeed aid and abet the enemy.

So why not call Dzhokhar Tsarnaev's actions treasonous? The terms treason (and traitor) raise many reasonable people's hackles because they are often labels hurled inappropriately by demagogues. Yet the word treason is the term that the Constitution employs for those who side with others in attacking their own country. Mere disloyalty--what rabble-rousers sometimes term treasonous--is different in kind from loading pressure cookers with ball bearings to cripple and kill fellow citizens as part of a broader statement.

Calling this latter action "treason" illuminates a compelling third option--one that is provided by the Constitution--between the two that are commonly presented. Eric Holder views trying suspected terrorists like garden-variety criminals as a litmus test of one's liberalism. The GOP views trying them like enemy combatants as proof positive of one's patriotism. The Constitution suggests that there may be a path satisfying both patriotic impulse and due process: Article III, Section 3 states that "Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort." Hence, in order to be tried for treason, the person so charged need not have aided a nation the United State is formally at war with; it suffices for that person to have aided those who are out to harm us. It does not matter if Dzhokhar Tsarnaev personally had ties to terrorist groups. It does not matter if he radicalized himself or he was brainwashed by his brother or mother or his third cousin.

An American found to have committed an act of terrorism should not be privileged compared to other terrorists, but on the contrary, subjected to harsher punishment, as he or she has committed an additional crime. The U.S. Code clearly indicates that treason should be strongly punished. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines "assign treason the highest possible base offense level," which "requires life imprisonment, regardless of the offender's criminal history; a death-qualified jury would, of course, be necessary to impose the death penalty." Clear enough. And, if the current information on his motivations is reliable, quite appropriate for the like of Mr. Dzhokhar Tsarnaev.

 

Obama's Brief

The president is either moping or muttering defensively about the abuses by the IRS and the tragedy of Benghazi. And to mollify the media about the alleged overreach of capturing the AP's phone records, he has offered to promote a legal shield for the media. As I see it, if he wakes up tomorrow and is willing to speak up, there are a few things he could fairly state.

First, any suggestion that "the IRS" went after the Tea Party are bogus. The IRS has hundreds of offices, with branches in all fifty states and in scores of cities. Only one of them, in one city (the Cincinnati office), is charged with having targeted the Tea Party and other conservative groups. Moreover, the screening began in the spring of 2010 when that IRS office and others were flooded with applications for tax exempt status from these groups. There was not such flood from the left. Further, the IRS office in Cincinnati was understaffed -- because Congress had not provided the IRS with sufficient funds to properly staff it. And the Cincinnati branch's focus on the new applicants seems to be particularly justified given that some of the groups that came under scrutiny considered the federal income tax, administered by the IRS, to be unconstitutional. As to the question of when the White House first heard about what was going on, this is the wrong question. Rather, the important question is when the investigation conducted by the Inspector General was concluded, which was last Wednesday, May 15. Any White House action before this would have been fairly criticized as interfering in the investigation. Next question.

As far as the Associated Press is concerned, the press claims the authorities need not worry because the media has been acting responsibly and publishing only news that -- in the judgment of its editors -- is safe to publish. Such claims disregard that more and more the media -- including the various blogs -- show very few signs of editorial responsibility. To remind: after the Boston bombing CNN and the New York Post published names and pictures of alleged bombers that turned out to be innocent people. As we know from the case of Richard Jewell, who was wrongly suspected of setting off a bomb during the 1996 Olympics in Atlanta and whose name was leaked to the media, false reports can cause a great deal of harm even if corrections are later published. Irresponsible reporting can be even more damaging when it outs undercover operatives. In 1975, for example, a newspaper published the names of dozens of active CIA officers, and shortly thereafter, an agent stationed in Athens was shot dead.

Read the rest here.

Soft Syria Response Worse Than Inaction

A weak or irrelevant response to the use of chemical weapons in Syria may be even worse than inaction. As long as President Obama delays action—as he waits for all the intelligence he requires—Syrians and others can still assume that when he is finally moved to act, he will unleash a thunderbolt, striking a blow against the regime that will convince one and all not to cross red lines drawn by the United States. But if Obama again follows his proclivity to split the difference—to appease the critics, but not address the challenge—he will demonstrate weakness.

Among the suggestions that have been made are for Obama to arm the rebels, to introduce a no-fly zone or to create a safe haven for refugees. Calls for such actions have come from both sides of the aisle: Republican senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham, as well as Democratic senator Carl Levin and representative Eliot Engel. But these acts are not likely to turn the tide against the rush of fighters—many with combat experience—from Iraq and Hezbollah in Lebanon that are joining in the defense of Assad, or the elite cohort of “advisers” and many thousands of troops supplied by Iran. And if the intervention by the United States were to tip the scales, we would have a new Libya on our hands, with one very devastating difference: jihadists with chemical weapons.

The notion advanced by Senator Graham that if we only arm “our” rebels (the few pro-Western ones) they will fight against both Assad and the extremists, is wishful thinking. “Ours” are the weakest of the lot. However, even if somehow “our” rebels prevailed, we should note that it did not take long for those who the United States armed in Afghanistan against the Soviets to turn on us, or for arms we supplied in Libya to flow into the hands of Al Qaeda in Mali.

Increasing humanitarian aid, especially helping Jordan and Turkey cope with the flood of refugees and providing more medical and food supplies to refugees in Syria, is both a very good idea and an irrelevant one. We should extend this aid whether or not Assad used chemical weapons, but such good deeds will not be, and will not be seen as, a response to the regime’s (or the rebels') violation of Obama’s red line.

Read the rest at The National Interest-->

Drones: Say it with figures

Originally published in United Press International

Attacking drones, the most effective counter-terrorism tool the United States has found thus far, is a new cause celebre among progressive public intellectuals and major segments of the media.

Their arguments would deserve more of a hearing if, instead of declaring their contentions as fact, they instead coughed up some evidence to support their claims.

One argument that is repeated again and again is that killing terrorists with drones generates resentment from Pakistan to Yemen, thereby breeding many more terrorists than are killed. For example, Akbar Ahmed, a distinguished professor at American University, told the BBC on April 9 that, for "every terrorist drones kill, perhaps 100 rise as a result."

The key word is "perhaps"; Ahmed cites no data to support his contention.

Similarly, in The New York Times, Jo Becker and Scott Shane write that "Drones have replaced Guantanamo as the recruiting tool of choice for militants," citing as their evidence one line Faisal Shahzad, who had tried to set off a car bomb in Times Square, used in his 2010 trial seeking to justify targeting civilians.

At the same time, when HBO interviewed children who carry suicide vests, they justified their acts by the presence of foreign troops in their country and burning of Korans.

No such self-serving statements can be taken as evidence in themselves.

And Peter Bergen, a responsible and serious student of drones, quotes approvingly in The Washington Post a new book by Mark Mazzetti, who claims that the use of drone strikes "creates enemies just as it has obliterated them." Again, however, Mazzetti presents no evidence.

One may at first consider it obvious that, when American drones kill terrorists who are members of a tribe or family, other members will resent the United States. And hence if the United States would stop targeting people from the skies, that resentment would abet and ultimately vanish.

In reality, ample evidence shows that large parts of the population of several Muslim countries resent the United States for numerous and profound reasons, unrelated to drone attacks.

These Muslims consider the United States to be the "Great Satan" because it violates core religious values they hold dear; it promotes secular democratic liberal regimes; it supports women's rights; and it exports a lifestyle that devout Muslims consider hedonistic and materialistic to their countries.

These feelings, data show, are rampant in countries in which no drones attacks have occurred, were common in those countries in which the drones have been employed well before any attacks took place, and continue unabated, even when drone attacks are greatly scaled back.

Read the rest at United Press International

Everything Libertarians and Liberals Get Wrong About Drones

Seven factoids about drones -- the new cause célèbre of libertarians and select liberals -- cannot stay aloft.

Critics argue that drones reflect a usurpation of power by the "imperial presidency." This is to say that President Obama, who has greatly expanded the employment of drones, is acting without Congressional authorization and oversight. Actually Congress granted the president on September 14, 2001, the power "to authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against those responsible for the recent attacks launched against the United States." If the critics' concern was merely that this resolution might not apply to those who are not card-carrying members of al-Qaeda -- and that Obama was thus overstepping the resolution's bounds -- they would focus their efforts on urging the president to return to Congress and ask for a new resolution with slightly more inclusive wording. He wouldn't need to worry; even the much-divided Congress would approve what it takes to stop terrorist, in particular after the latest attack in Boston. However, this is hardly what critics call for, revealing that their true motive is to curb the use of drones rather than find ways to dot the i's and cross the t's when it comes to their use.

Critics also complain that drones are not subject to Congressional oversight. Actually Congress is regularly briefed about this campaign. As Democratic Senator Diane Feinstein of California, a strong liberal herself, recently stated: "Senate Intelligence Committee is kept fully informed of counterterrorism operations and keeps close watch to make sure they are effective, responsible and in keeping with U.S. and international law."

Critics further claim that, according to international law, force should be used only when terrorists pose an imminent treat. However, because terrorists do not abide by the rules of armed conflicts, which require that combatants identify themselves as such, and not merely reveal their status only when ready to strike, all those who can be reliably identified as terrorists are a legitimate target. Imagine if the terrorists wore uniforms and belonged to, say, the German army in World War II. They then would be a fair target whether they were training, regrouping, rearming, or even at rest. Simply because al-Qaeda and its associates hide their status does not mean that they should be accorded better protection.

Read the rest at The Atlantic--

The Risk of Blurring the Red Lines

The Obama administration is ignoring two of the most elementary rules of the use of power: First of all, the more credible threats are, the less power one needs to marshal (and hence less one needs to spend on building it up), and the less often power needs to be actually exercised. Second, every time one makes a threat, one is tested twice: will it bring about the desired outcome? And will it build up or diminish the credibility of one’s power?

In March, President Obama announced that if the Assad regime will use chemical weapons this would be a “game changer.” When reports first surfaced that such weapons were used, the Obama administration pointed out that these appeared to be riot control agents, such as pepper spray and tear gas, which is often used by police forces. These may be considered chemical weapons in the Middle East, but the United States does not consider them as such. (It was also unclear whether it was the rebels or the government who had employed these agents.)

Most recently, however, when Britain, France, and Israel reported that nerve gas agents were used by the Assad regime, the Obama administration responded that the United States was investigating the matter. As these reports come in, the study continues.

One can readily understand the reluctance of the Obama administration to act, given the large quantities, varying kinds, and wide dispersion of the chemical agents in Syria. Moreover, the chemical weapons are not easily handled; safely destroying them will very likely entangle the United States in the civil war; and such involvement would almost certainly lack UN authorization. However, all this was known before the United States drew the red line. Hence, if the Obama administration continues to dillydally, it will further undermine the credibility of the United States as a superpower, a position already shaken by its failing engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The same holds for the shifting red lines—the plural “lines” is not a misprint—drawn, redrawn and repositioned on Iran’s nuclear development. From the beginning of his first term, President Obama indicated that the United States would find it “unacceptable” if Iran were to pursue a nuclear weapon program. Yet it seems that Iran’s nuclear development did not stop. In September 2009 the administration threw its support behind a proposal that would allow Iran to pursue uranium enrichment up to 5 percent. The deal was rejected, and by February 2010, Iran was producing 20 percent enriched uranium. The administration decided that 20 percent was now acceptable—as long as Iran did not move toward constructing a bomb. The president pledged “not to contain, but to prevent an Iranian bomb,” even if that meant military action.

Read the rest at The National Interest-->